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Abstract
A harmonized worldwide carbon tax, implemented at regional or national
level, can be enforced only with an international collective action which takes
into account inherent interests of all countries. The purpose of this study is
to assess the impact of the implementation of such a tax by means of dif-
ferent scenarios based on realistic assumptions. We endeavor to design a
world tax on anthropogenic greenhouse-gases emissions which can be po-
litically acceptable and technically feasible. To do so, we also address in-
ternational equity through lump-sum transfer and transfers based on coun-
tries’ financial capacity. After defining the reference scenario (a so called
“business-as-usual” scenario), we carry out a meta-analysis of previous at-
tempts to estimate the marginal abatement costs produced by 26 different
models. The meta-analysis helps us to define a starting point for devising a
politically acceptable and technologically feasible tax. From there, we im-
plement different scenarios which introduce carefully considered principles
of international equity in the search for politically acceptable and techno-
logically feasible world tax schemes. In performing those simulations, we
are concerned about both tax efficiency — societal welfare impact — and
tax effectiveness — climate impact. This basket of efficiency considerations
leads us to set up the simulations in a way that addresses these two issues
simultaneously in a concise manner.
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1 Introduction
A harmonized worldwide carbon tax, implemented at regional or national level,
can be enforced only with an international collective action which takes into ac-
count inherent interests of all countries. The purpose of this study is to assess the
impact of the implementation of such a tax by means of different scenarios based
on realistic assumptions. We endeavor to design a world tax on anthropogenic
greenhouse-gases emissions which can be politically acceptable and technically
feasible. To do so, we also address international equity through lump-sum transfer
and transfers based on countries’ financial capacity.
After defining the reference scenario (a so called “business-as-usual” scenario),
we carry out a meta-analysis of previous attempts to estimate the marginal abate-
ment costs produced by 26 different models. The meta-analysis helps us to define a
starting point for devising a politically acceptable and technologically feasible tax.
From there, we implement different scenarios which introduce carefully consid-
ered principles of international equity in the search for politically acceptable and
technologically feasible world tax schemes.
In performing those simulations, we are concerned about both tax efficiency—
societal welfare impact — and tax effectiveness — climate impact. This basket of
efficiency considerations leads us to set up the simulations in a way that addresses
these two issues simultaneously in a concise manner.
Section 2 briefly presents the GEMINI-E3 model which has been used to per-
form the simulations. Section 3 presents the main assumptions of the reference
scenario. In section 4, the tax level is set exogenously and uniformly according to
the meta-analysis previously conducted and defines the starting point in our simu-
lations. Section 5 and 6 present the simulations results when an endogenous tax is
applied. In one set of simulations (Section 5) the tax is set endogenously accord-
ing to damage costs of climate change; in another set of simulations (Section 6)
the tax is set with a view to adaptation costs. In these sections, we thus strive to
devise a scheme where equity among tax contributors is attained in order to ensure
participation. Finally we conclude in section 7. A sensitivity analysis is performed
in appendix 8.
2 Modeling Framework
The GEMINI-E3 is a dynamic-recursive CGE model which represents the world
economy in 28 regions and 18 sectors, and contains a highly detailed representation
of indirect taxation (Bernard and Vielle, 1998, 2007). The version of GEMINI-E3
used in this study is formulated as a Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP),
which is solved using GAMS and the PATH solver (Ferris and Munson, 2000; Fer-
ris and Pang, 1997). GEMINI-E3 is built on a comprehensive energy-economy
data set, the GTAP-6 database (Dimaranan, 2006), that provides a consistent repre-
sentation of energy markets in physical units, a detailed Social Accounting Matrix
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(SAM) for a large set of countries or regions, and bilateral trade flows between
them. The reference year of the database is 2001. Given that, this year is quite old,
we integrate in an ad hoc way the main recent trends in the energy market, like
for example the increase in energy prices (see section 3.1). Also, we have comple-
mented the data from the GTAP database with information on indirect taxation and
government expenditures from the International Energy Agency (2002a,b, 2005),
the Organisation For Economic Co-operation and Development (2005, 2003) and
the International Monetary Fund (2004). For non CO2 greenhouse gases (GHG),
data on emissions and abatement costs comes from the United States Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (2006). The first version of GEMINI-E3 and its succes-
sors, have been especially designed to calculate the social Marginal Abatement
Costs1 (Bernard and Vielle, 2003).
The original version of GEMINI-E3 is described in Bernard and Vielle (2007)
and on the internet2. Various versions of the model have been used to analyze the
implementation of economic instruments allowing for GHG emissions reductions
in a second-best setting (Bernard and Vielle, 2000). The following studies are ex-
amples of various analyses carried out with GEMINI-E3: the assessment of the
strategic allocation of GHG emission allowances in the enlarged EU market (Vigu-
ier et al., 2006), the analysis of Russia’s behavior with respect to the Kyoto Proto-
col ratification process (Bernard et al., 2002, 2003), the assessment of the Protocol
implementation cost in Switzerland with and without international emissions trad-
ing schemes (Bernard et al., 2005), the assessment of oil prices increase effects on
global en regional GHG emissions (Vielle and Viguier, 2007).
Apart from a comprehensive description of indirect taxation, the specificity
of the model is to simulate all relevant markets: e.g. commodities (through rela-
tive prices), labour (through wages) as well as domestic and international savings
(through interest rates and exchange rates). Terms of trade (i.e. real income trans-
fers between countries resulting from variations of imports and exports relative
prices) and “real” exchange rates can also be accurately represented.
Time periods are linked in the model through endogenous real interest rates,
which are determined by the equilibrium between savings and investments. GEMINI-
E3 is a model based on recursive dynamics. Expectations of agents are based on
adaptative rules and the model does not presume perfect foresight. National and
regional models are linked by endogenous real exchange rates resulting from con-
straints on foreign trade deficits or surpluses.
GEMINI-E3 provides the following outputs for each region or country and for
each year: carbon taxes, marginal abatement costs, price of tradable permits (when
relevant), abatement of GHG emissions, net sales of tradable permits (when rele-
vant) and total net welfare loss, which is also available in a disaggregated manner
as net loss from terms of trade, pure deadweight loss of taxation, net purchases
1MAC, i.e. the welfare loss of a unit increase in pollution abatement.
2For a complete description of the model, please refer to all technical documents available at:
http://gemini-e3.epfl.ch.
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of tradable permits when relevant. Macroeconomic aggregates such as production,
imports and final demand are also provided by the model, as well as real exchange
rates, real interest rates and sectorial data such as changes in production or use of
production factors.
The welfare indicator used in this study is consumer surplus. It has been ex-
plained elsewhere that, in the case of General Equilibrium Model (Bernard and
Vielle, 2003) demonstrate that neither GDP at constant prices nor households’ fi-
nal consumption at constant prices can provide relevant measures of the economic
costs climate change policies.
In effect, one — even the major — effect of the considered policy is to change
relative prices, precisely in order to favor the desirable, and least costly, substitu-
tions. Any measure by an aggregate quantity at constant prices, in line with the
rules of national accounting, cannot capture the very part of the welfare loss (even-
tually gain) resulting from this change in relative prices. Surplus provides a reliable
measure by representing the effect of change in relative prices by an equivalent in-
come loss. In particular, the sign of surplus is the same as the sign of utility change,
positive if utility increases and negative if utility decreases. In order to compare
surplus among countries we divide this measure by household consumption. So,
in the following pages, the welfare impact is expressed in percentage of household
consumption.
Finally, for this study we use an aggregated version of the model, 14 regions
rather than the original 28 (see table 1).
Table 1: GEMINI-E3 Regional Description
Name Countries
EUR European Union (25)
XEU Other European Countries
FSU Former Soviet Union (except Baltic States)
USA United States of America
CAN Canada
AUZ Australia and New Zealand
JAP Japan
MEX Mexico
CHI China
IND India
ASI Rest of Asia
LAT Central and Latin America
MID Middle East
AFR Africa
3 The Reference Scenario
The reference or “Business as usual” scenario is used to quantify the economic
and GHG emissions path of the world up to 2050, considering all energy policies
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enforced in all regions up to 2001, which is the base year of the GTAP database.
The reference scenario we use is calibrated by means of the different procedures
explained below.
3.1 International Energy Prices
The oil price projections used in this reference scenario are mainly taken from the
International Energy Outlook (IEO) published by the US Department of Energy
(DOE) (Energy Information Administration, 2006a). The DOE expects lower in-
vestments and oil production in key oil producing regions; this being mainly due to
restrictions on access and contracting, which affect oil exploration and production
costs.
In our reference scenario we assume that oil prices in 2010 are at 36 USD per
barrel at 2004 prices and increase linearly to 57 USD in 2030. After 2030, oil
prices rise linearly up to 69 USD per barrel in 2050. Table 2 shows a comparison
of several oil price projections collected by the DOE (Energy Information Admin-
istration, 2006b).
Table 2: Forecast of world oil prices (USD2004 per barrel)
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
GEMINI-E3 35.80 50.70 56.97 62.93 69.51
International Energy Outlook 2006
Reference 47.29 50.70 56.97
High price 62.65 85.06 95.71
Low price 40.29 33.99 33.73
International Energy Agency 35.00 37.00 39.00
International Energy Agency (deferred investment) 41.00 46.00 52.00
Petroleum Industry Research Associates 44.10 63.35
Petroleum Economics Ltd. 47.84 49.80
Global Insight Inc. 37.82 31.53 34.50
Altos Partners 27.58 34.02 40.03
Energy and Environmental Analysis Inc. 46.74 42.79
Strategic Energy and Economic Research Inc. 29.54 32.00 36.50
Source: Energy Information Administration (2006b)
Concerning other fossil energies, we assume an indexation of natural gas prices
to oil prices of 0.5 (i.e. the price of gas increases by 5%when the oil price increases
by 10%) and stability of coal prices in real USD3.
3.2 GDP, Energy Demand and GHG Emissions
The reference scenario for each region is calibrated with projections of CO2 emis-
sions, energy consumption, GDP and populations for the years 2000 to 2030, as
provided by the Energy Information Administration (2006a). From 2030 to 2050,
3In this report, unless otherwise specified all prices are in 2001 USD
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we suppose that the annual growth of GDP per capita will linearly converge to 2%
in industrialized regions (except Japan, Canada and Australia) and to 2.5% in de-
veloping regions. Table 3 summarizes the projected annual GDP growth for each
region.
Table 3: Projected Average Annual Growth in GDP
2001–2010 2010–2020 2020–2030 2030–2040 2040–2050
EUR 2.2% 2.2% 2.1% 1.9% 1.9%
XEU 2.2% 2.2% 2.1% 1.8% 1.8%
FSU 5.4% 3.7% 3.2% 2.8% 2.8%
USA 3.3% 3.0% 2.8% 2.3% 2.2%
CAN 2.8% 2.2% 1.7% 1.4% 1.3%
AUZ 2.7% 2.4% 2.4% 2.0% 1.9%
JAP 1.9% 1.4% 0.9% 1.1% 1.1%
MEX 3.5% 4.2% 4.1% 3.7% 3.6%
CHI 7.9% 5.7% 5.1% 4.3% 3.9%
IND 6.3% 5.3% 5.0% 4.3% 4.3%
ASI 3.8% 3.4% 3.1% 2.6% 2.6%
LAT 4.0% 3.6% 3.5% 2.8% 2.8%
MID 5.2% 3.9% 3.6% 2.5% 2.5%
AFR 5.0% 4.3% 4.1% 3.2% 3.2%
World 3.3% 3.0% 2.8% 2.5% 2.5%
Figure 1 shows the projected world final energy consumption we have used
in the reference scenario. Final energy consumption increases by 1.7% annually
whereas the global annual economic growth reaches 2.8% . High oil and natural
gas prices make coal and electricity more competitive and attractive (Vielle and
Viguier, 2007).
As a result, coal consumption grows by 2.3% per year and electricity by 1.7%.
By contract, petroleum products and natural gas consumption, as a consequence of
the high prices, increase only by 1% and 0.9% per year respectively.
Figure 2 shows the global emissions of the various GHG. The share of CO2
emissions increases slightly from 71% in 2001 to 75% in 2050 whereas the shares
of nitrous oxide and high GWP gases remain stable. The proportion of methane
decreases from 18% in 2001 to 15% in 2050. Table 4 presents GHG emissions
projections by regions. World GHG emissions start at 9.1 GtC in 2001 to reach
18.5 GtC in 2050. In 2001, developing countries GHG emissions represent 47% of
world emissions. This share reaches respectively 56% in 2020 and 66% in 2050.
These emissions projections are in line with a recent OECD report (see Organisa-
tion For Economic Co-operation and Development (2007)).
We use the climate module of the MERGE model to compute the impacts of
emissions on temperature changes. This climate module comprises a description
of the carbon cycle and the earth radiative balance (Manne and Richels, 2005). We
also adjust its ocean lag parameter (the number of years for the oceans to be as
warm as the atmosphere) following the changes of Knutti and Meehl (2005). Ta-
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Table 4: Baseline GHG Emissions in MtC-eq per year
2001 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
EUR 1 302 1 339 1 391 1 431 1 465 1 512
XEU 139 148 160 164 164 166
FSU 812 951 1 086 1 171 1 213 1 275
USA 1 899 2 057 2 232 2 393 2 473 2 567
CAN 194 211 225 223 216 211
AUZ 170 182 194 197 195 193
JAP 340 346 341 321 307 296
MEX 157 184 229 265 295 331
CHI 1 262 1 877 2 735 3 786 4 784 5 897
IND 437 583 767 1 014 1 249 1 535
ASI 763 889 1 018 1 133 1 193 1 257
LAT 598 708 836 965 1047 1 130
MID 469 610 738 848 882 920
AFR 555 684 839 1 015 1 128 1 254
World 9 097 10 769 12 789 14 926 16 613 18 542
ble 5 presents the temperature increase from the pre-industrial era in the reference
scenario with 3 different climate sensitivities from 2 ◦C to 3 ◦C. Climate sensitivity
corresponds to the change in global mean surface temperature at the equilibrium
for a doubling of the atmospheric CO2-equivalent concentration (McCarthy et al.,
2001). In 2050, temperature projections vary then from 1.47 ◦C to 1.88 ◦C. Cli-
mate sensitivity is an important parameter because it alters the damages estimates
values. From the literature, the mean climate sensitivity is about 3 ◦C. In this re-
port, we retain lower values as mentioned in a recent OECD report (Organisation
For Economic Co-operation and Development, 2007).
Table 5: Temperature increase from the preindustrial era
Climate sensitivity in ◦C 2 2.5 3
Year Temperature ◦C
2000 0.6 0.6 0.6
2001 0.61 0.61 0.61
2010 0.69 0.71 0.73
2020 0.83 0.89 0.94
2030 1.02 1.12 1.21
2040 1.23 1.38 1.53
2050 1.47 1.68 1.88
4 Building on Previous Estimates
Many studies over recent years have set out to provide policy makers with estimates
of the marginal abatement costs for GHG. Recently a new generation of models has
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included endogenous technological change (ETC) in their framework, improving
the ability of models to capture reality. To account for these recent developments in
modeling climate change, we perform a meta-analysis of the marginal abatement
costs calculated by 26 different models, most of them incorporating ETC, which
provide us with 103 estimates of the marginal abatement costs (Bicchetti et al., to
appear).
A meta-analysis is the pooling of several different studies that address a set of
related hypotheses in an attempt to overcome problems related to the interpretation
of contradictory or flawed results depending on the assumptions made to realize the
study. Analyzing the results of different studies may provide a more comprehensive
and accurate view of a given topic.
In the case of the marginal cost of carbon emissions, the various studies have
provided researchers and policy makers with a wide range of estimates starting
from almost nothing to huge amounts like over 400 USD/tC depending on dif-
ferent assumptions (about the pure rate of time preference for instance). In this
context it is quite difficult to make a judgement about a meaningful value estimate
for the marginal costs of carbon emission. Performing a meta-analysis on this topic
can certainly yield a more precise range of central estimates concerning the costs
of carbon. Given the fact that current trends focus on ETC and adaptation policy
to mitigate climate change, a meta-analysis incorporating the latest models with
ETC can be expected to yield pertinent results. Therefore we have focused on esti-
mates published between 1999 and 2007 for our meta-analysis; but we nonetheless
incorporate some studies which did not include ETC in their model.
We gather our 103 marginal abatement cost estimates for the year 2010 from 13
different studies realized with 26 different models and we construct the probability
density function of the 103 gathered estimates (see Figure 3). We find that the
modal score of the distribution equals 15 USD. Therefore, we take 15 USD/tC as a
starting point for a world carbon tax in the next simulations presented in section 4.
4.1 World Carbon Tax Redistributed Within Each Region
4.1.1 World Carbon Tax of 15 USD
In this scenario we assume that a carbon tax 15 USD2001 per ton of carbon is
enforced at the world level over the whole time horizon of the simulation (i.e.
2007–2040). As already said, 15 USD corresponds to the distribution mode of
these marginal costs (see Figure 3). The carbon tax revenue is collected in each
region and redistributed to the households of the same region through a lump-
sum transfer in order to maintain the same government budget deficit or surplus
as computed in the reference scenario. We have a textbook efficient pollution tax,
since it is applied to all sources at the same rate. This carbon tax has a low impact
on emissions reductions and temperature changes. The main explanation is the
inherent climate inertia and the short time horizon.
Table 7 shows the contribution of each region to CO2 emissions reductions.
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Figure 3: Distribution of the carbon taxes from the literature (USD2001)
Table 6: Carbon Tax and World GHG Emissions — Scenario World Carbon Tax of
15 USD with Regional Redistribution
2010 2020 2030 2040
Carbon tax in USD 15 15 15 15
Carbon tax revenue in billion USD 107 125 144 158
GHG Emissions variation -5.9% -7.8% -9.4% -11.1%
CO2 Emissions variation -7.9% -10.4% -12.5% -14.6%
Temperature increase in ◦C 0.71 0.88 1.10 1.34
Difference w.r.t. baseline in ◦C -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04
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Table 7: CO2 Emissions change in % — Scenario World Carbon Tax of 15 USD
with Regional Redistribution
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -2.6% -2.6% -2.5% -2.4%
XEU -3.8% -4.0% -3.8% -3.8%
FSU -4.8% -5.1% -5.5% -6.0%
USA -4.2% -4.2% -4.1% -4.0%
CAN -2.6% -2.3% -2.1% -1.9%
AUZ -4.2% -4.4% -4.4% -4.3%
JAP -2.0% -2.1% -2.1% -2.1%
MEX -2.1% -1.7% -1.7% -1.8%
CHI -25.8% -30.2% -32.9% -35.5%
IND -10.2% -12.1% -13.8% -15.4%
ASI -3.9% -4.5% -4.8% -5.0%
LAT -2.1% -2.0% -2.0% -2.1%
MID -2.6% -2.3% -2.4% -2.5%
AFR -4.4% -4.8% -5.4% -5.8%
World -7.9% -10.4% -12.5% -14.6%
note that the greatest reductions are obtained in China and India, where the greatest
potentials for low-cost emission reduction are available. Those efforts are reflected
in the welfare impacts in Table 8, but the correlation between abatement effort and
welfare loss is not very strong. Indeed, terms of trade effects also play a role. They
lead to positive welfare impacts in Europe (EUR) and in Japan (JAP), regions that
are big importers of fossil fuels. They benefit from lower fossil fuels prices due
to the decrease in energy demand. The opposite effect increases the loss for fossil
fuels exporting countries (MID, FSU and AFR) (Barnetta et al., 2004; Ghanem
et al., 1999). Similarly, China, which is endowed with large reserves of coal gains
nothing from lower fossil fuel prices, contrary to the situation for India.
In Table 6, we can note a -14.6% change in CO2 emissions but a relatively
minor impact on temperature increase with respect to the reference scenario (-
0.04◦C) in 2040. To increase effectiveness we consider an alternative tax level
derived from the literature.
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Table 8: Welfare impact in percent of household consumption — Scenario World
Carbon of 15 USD Tax with Regional Redistribution
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR 0.04% 0.05% 0.05% 0.04%
XEU -0.14% -0.15% -0.13% -0.11%
FSU -0.26% -0.27% -0.22% -0.18%
USA -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
CAN -0.09% -0.10% -0.09% -0.09%
AUZ -0.34% -0.30% -0.24% -0.20%
JAP 0.06% 0.07% 0.05% 0.04%
MEX -0.09% -0.07% -0.06% -0.04%
CHI -0.28% -0.25% -0.23% -0.21%
IND -0.07% -0.04% -0.04% -0.04%
ASI 0.14% 0.14% 0.12% 0.10%
LAT -0.08% -0.07% -0.06% -0.05%
MID -0.54% -0.46% -0.38% -0.31%
AFR -0.35% -0.33% -0.28% -0.23%
World -0.03% -0.03% -0.03% -0.06%
4.1.2 World Carbon Tax of 348 USD
Tol Tol (2005) in a literature review finds that a tax set at 95 USD/tCO2 represents
the 95 percentile of a probability density function of marginal damage estimates.
The already quoted OECD report (Organisation For Economic Co-operation and
Development, 2007) performs also a simulation with a tax rate of 95 USD/tCO2.
Converting the tax into units per ton of carbon, we obtain a tax of 348 USD/tC.
Such a high tax would undoubtedly have a strong impact on carbon emissions.
Simulation results are presented in Table 9 .
Table 9: Carbon Tax and World GHG Emissions — Scenario World Carbon Tax of
348 USD with Regional Redistribution
2010 2020 2030 2040
Carbon tax in USD $ 348 348 348 348
Carbon tax revenue in billion USD 1643 1905 2186 2388
GHG Emissions variation -29.0% -30.5% -32.0% -33.5%
CO2 Emissions variation -37.5% -39.6% -41.7% -43.5%
Temperature increase in ◦C 0.71 0.86 1.03 1.22
Difference w.r.t. baseline in ◦C -0.00 -0.03 -0.09 -0.16
The tax has a significant impact on emissions trends since emissions of CO2 are
-43.5% lower in 2040 with respect to the baseline. Also it brings tangible results
concerning climate change since the calculations signal a temperature increase of
1.22◦C in 2040 which 0.16◦C below the baseline. Moreover, such a tax generates
also a huge revenue, which reaches 2388 billion USD in 2040.
As shown in Table 10, the greatest CO2 emissions change (relative to the ref-
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Table 10: CO2 Emissions change in %— Scenario World Carbon Tax of 348 USD
with Regional Redistribution
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -20.5% -19.8% -18.3% -17.0%
XEU -28.2% -26.9% -26.0% -25.2%
FSU -38.9% -37.4% -37.0% -37.0%
USA -34.0% -32.6% -31.6% -30.6%
CAN -26.3% -23.9% -22.5% -21.2%
AUZ -53.9% -36.7% -35.5% -34.5%
JAP -18.5% -18.0% -17.2% -16.5%
MEX -24.2% -20.3% -19.5% -18.9%
CHI -64.9% -68.2% -69.9% -71.4%
IND -48.6% -52.3% -53.8% -55.0%
ASI -31.9% -32.4% -32.6% -32.7%
LAT -22.3% -19.8% -18.9% -18.0%
MID -31.7% -28.2% -27.4% -26.4%
AFR -36.7% -37.2% -38.3% -38.9%
World -37.5% -39.6% -41.7% -43.5%
erence scenario) occurs in China, with an impressive -71.4% in 2040. This is due
to the fact that China has large coal reserves and therefore its GHG emissions have
a high carbon intensity. Generally, developing countries’ (DC) emissions vary sig-
nificantly relative to the reference scenario, because their marginal abatement costs
are lower and because they do not have access easily to cleaner production tech-
niques. Among OECD countries EUR and JAP have an emissions variation below
20%. This can be explained by the fact that EUR and JAP already have a heavy
tax policy on fossil energy and that they have already done a lot to promote cleaner
production techniques.
Table 11 presents the welfare impact in percent of household consumption. As
expected, with such a high tax, countries whose exports are energy intensive are the
hardest hit by the tax. For instance, FSU and MID welfare decrease by 11.67% and
13.14% respectively (with respect to the baseline). Despite the tax effectiveness
(in terms of reduced climate change pressures) and relative allocative efficiency
(all countries pay the same tax which induces less “distortion”), its acceptability
is far from certain. All of FSU, CHI, MID and AFR must bear major costs if
such a policy were implemented because those regions are the major exporters of
fossil energy while the main net importers (EUR, JAP and ASI) benefit from lower
energy prices.
Therefore, we return to consideration of simulations with a flat 15 USD tax but
we endeavor to increase effectiveness by broadening the tax base of the world tax
to all GHG emissions (and not only carbon emissions).
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Table 11: Welfare impact in percent of household consumption — Scenario World
Carbon Tax of 348 USD with Regional Redistribution
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR 0.61% 0.83% 0.88% 0.88%
XEU -4.32% -4.15% -3.84% -3.55%
FSU -19.91% -15.65% -13.39% -11.67%
USA -0.57% -0.27% -0.16% -0.09%
CAN -2.68% -2.14% -1.97% -1.81%
AUZ -5.74% -2.22% -1.46% -1.11%
JAP 0.91% 1.07% 0.98% 0.88%
MEX -2.47% -2.23% -1.90% -1.57%
CHI -4.62% -3.58% -2.82% -2.15%
IND -2.77% -1.61% -0.81% -0.17%
ASI 0.72% 1.35% 1.34% 1.24%
LAT -2.63% -2.20% -1.90% -1.64%
MID -21.54% -16.76% -14.96% -13.14%
AFR -11.20% -9.61% -8.65% -7.67%
World -1.47% -1.12% -0.93% -1.75%
4.2 World GHG Tax Redistributed Within Each Region
In this section, we are concerned with increasing the tax effectiveness and effi-
ciency with respect to the scenario World Carbon Tax of 15 USD with Regional
Redistribution. To this end, we introduce a flat world tax of 15 USD per ton of
carbon equivalent on GHG emissions. As in the previous simulation, the tax rev-
enue is collected in each region and it is redistributed then to the households of the
region through lump-sum transfers.
In Table 12, GHG emissions variation is slightly more important (-15.5%) than
with respect to the World Carbon Tax of 15 USD with Regional Redistribution
computed in the previous simulation. However, the impact on temperature change
is 100% greater (-0.08◦C w.r.t -0.04◦C), showing a better effectiveness (for the
same tax effort) than the previous scenario. The global welfare impact is close to
that of the World Carbon Tax of 15 USD with Regional Redistribution, i.e., about
-0.07% of 2040 consumption.
Table 12: GHG Tax and World GHG Emissions — Scenario World GHG Tax with
Regional Redistribution
2010 2020 2030 2040
GHG tax in USD 15 15 15 15
GHG tax revenue in billion USD 144 167 192 210
GHG Emissions variation -10.8% -12.8% -14.1% -15.5%
CO2 Emissions variation -8.0% -10.5% -12.6% -14.7%
Temperature increase in ◦C 0.71 0.87 1.07 1.30
Difference w.r.t. baseline in ◦C -0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.08
Welfare impact in percent of household consumption -0.04% -0.04% -0.04% -0.07%
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The impact of the world GHG tax on CO2 emissions is nearly identical to that
of the world carbon tax of same rate (-14.7% w.r.t -14.6% in 2040). However
the impact on GHG emissions is improved since this time the variation reaches
-15.5% in 2040, which is 40% better with respect to the World Carbon Tax sce-
nario (-11.1%). In terms of temperature difference with respect to the baseline,
we obtain in 2040 -0.08◦C instead of -0.04◦C for the carbon tax, which represents
again a gain of 100%. This improvement in effectiveness can be explained by
the fact that the abatement cost for GHG other than the CO2 is lower (see Reilly
et al., 2006; Vuuren et al., 2006; Weyant et al., 2006). By examining carefully the
results, the principal GHG responsible for those results is CH4, which has a life-
time much lower than other GHG, about 12 years (McCarthy et al., 2001; Reilly
et al., 2006) against 100 years for CO2. With this relatively short lifetime, reduc-
ing emissions produces a tangible and quick impact on temperature. Also by taxing
all GHG, we get a stronger reduction in GHG emissions, improving the effective-
ness for tackling global warming, and in the meantime by enlarging the tax base
we also increase the tax revenue, gaining in redistribution opportunities. To sum
up, a GHG tax improves the efficiency, fiscal and redistribution opportunities, and
environmental gains, at a similar cost in terms of welfare impact.
However, despite the fact that the GHG tax is almost twice as effective as the
carbon tax, there is considerable doubt about its feasibility. After CO2, CH4 is
the most important GHG and it is primarily a by-product of agricultural activities
(paddy fields, cattle breeding, etc.). Taxing all GHG emissions poses the problems
of observability and verifiability, in short the problem of monitoring.
It requires emissions accounting for which some Developing Countries (DC)
may not have sufficient resources. Such a tax policy therefore not easy to imple-
ment rigorously, due to these monitoring considerations and administrative capa-
bilities.
A tax policy based on other GHG should be easier to implement since most of
them are like CO2, produced through industrial processes. However, their lifetime
in some cases are much longer (up to 50 000 years) (McCarthy et al., 2001; Reilly
et al., 2006) and therefore impacts of such policy would require much more time
before yielding tangible results.
For all these reasons, the next set of simulations focuses on variations of world
carbon tax policies.
4.3 International Carbon Tax Revenue Redistribution Based on In-
come and Population
In this scenario, we return to the pure carbon tax at 15 USD per ton and add to our
simulations considerations about equity. To this end, the carbon tax global revenue
is redistributed on the basis of a GDP per capita criterion and each world region
receives part of the tax revenue according to shares based on this equity criterion.
Tables 13 and 14 show the shares of the total revenue attributed to each region
and their evolution until the year 2040. The shares (αit) for the region i at time t
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are computed with the following formulas:
βit =
P
j GDPjtP
j Popjt
GDPit
Popit
(1)
and
αit =
βit · Popit∑
j βjt · Popjt
. (2)
Table 13: Revenue allocation based on GDP per capita
GDP 2001 Population 2001 GDP per capita Share 2001
millions USD thousand USD %
EUR 8 364 387 451 993 18 506 0.42
XEU 563 650 62 971 8 951 0.12
FSU 410 541 267 162 1 537 3.01
USA 10 337 035 284 154 36 378 0.14
CAN 712 479 30 689 23 216 0.02
AUZ 417 041 22 889 18 220 0.02
JAP 4 161 916 127 034 32 762 0.07
MEX 611 564 100 088 6 110 0.28
CHI 1 294 329 1 273 979 1 016 21.68
IND 463 642 1 021 084 454 38.88
ASI 1 473 994 957 451 1 539 10.75
LAT 1 363 068 422 841 3 224 2.27
MID 788 804 236 161 3 340 1.22
AFR 540 159 812 466 665 21.13
World 31 502 611 6 070 962 5 189 100.00
Table 14: Evolution of allocations shares
2001 2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR 0.42% 0.45% 0.45% 0.45% 0.42%
XEU 0.12% 0.12% 0.11% 0.11% 0.09%
FSU 3.01% 2.23% 1.79% 1.49% 1.22%
USA 0.14% 0.15% 0.16% 0.17% 0.18%
CAN 0.02% 0.03% 0.03% 0.04% 0.04%
AUZ 0.02% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.04%
JAP 0.07% 0.07% 0.08% 0.08% 0.08%
MEX 0.28% 0.33% 0.33% 0.30% 0.27%
CHI 21.68% 15.49% 11.97% 9.23% 7.00%
IND 38.88% 37.76% 34.79% 30.90% 26.64%
ASI 10.75% 13.11% 14.73% 16.23% 17.10%
LAT 2.27% 2.63% 2.80% 2.86% 2.85%
MID 1.22% 1.41% 1.63% 1.80% 2.00%
AFR 21.13% 26.19% 31.11% 36.31% 42.08%
Sum 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
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Carbon tax revenues amount to only about 0.3% of world GDP, so that inter-
national redistribution has little aggregate impact. Indeed, the impact of the tax
on global GHG emissions and temperature change are virtually identical to the
scenario with regional redistribution (compare Tables 15 and 6).
Table 15: Carbon tax and world GHG emissions— Scenario world carbon tax with
international redistribution
2010 2020 2030 2040
Carbon tax in USD 15 15 15 15
Carbon tax revenue in billion USD 98 114 131 144
GHG Emissions variation -5.7% -7.6% -9.3% -11.0%
CO2 Emissions variation -7.8% -10.3% -12.5% -14.6%
Temperature increase in ◦C 0.71 0.88 1.10 1.34
Difference w.r.t. baseline in ◦C -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04
Tables 16 and 17 show that Africa is the main winner and its welfare gains
reach 4.84% of household consumption in 2040, which is significantly different
from the results obtained with a regional redistribution (-0.23% in Table 8). Other
winners are India and Asia with welfare gains evaluated at 3.53% and 0.73% of
household consumption.
Table 16: Welfare impact in percent of household consumption — Scenario world
carbon tax with international redistribution
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -0.26% -0.20% -0.15% -0.12%
XEU -0.51% -0.42% -0.33% -0.27%
FSU -2.93% -2.35% -2.04% -1.76%
USA -0.37% -0.32% -0.28% -0.24%
CAN -0.74% -0.60% -0.49% -0.40%
AUZ -1.07% -0.84% -0.68% -0.55%
JAP -0.15% -0.13% -0.10% -0.08%
MEX -0.42% -0.32% -0.28% -0.25%
CHI -0.34% -1.06% -1.35% -1.40%
IND 10.07% 7.88% 5.45% 3.53%
ASI 0.69% 0.75% 0.77% 0.73%
LAT -0.24% -0.15% -0.12% -0.10%
MID -1.28% -0.92% -0.76% -0.60%
AFR 5.05% 4.70% 4.77% 4.84%
WORLD -0.02% -0.02% -0.02% -0.05%
Despite the fact that China receives an important share of the tax revenue (7%),
it also pays a significant part of it. Its net contribution equals -26 billions USD
(see table 17), thus making China’s net welfare variation negative (-1.4%). Other
regions also have a decrease in terms of welfare with respect to the scenario World
Tax with national redistribution scheme.
As expected, we find that the tax revenue allocation has a strong impact on
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Table 17: Net revenue of the world carbon tax in billions USD
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -13 -13 -13 -14
XEU -1 -1 -1 -1
FSU -7 -9 -10 -11
USA -23 -25 -27 -28
CAN -2 -2 -2 -2
AUZ -2 -2 -2 -2
JAP -4 -4 -4 -3
MEX -1 -1 -2 -2
CHI 0 -8 -17 -26
IND 32 33 31 27
ASI 5 8 11 14
LAT -1 -1 -1 -1
MID -4 -5 -6 -6
AFR 22 31 42 54
sum 0 0 0 0
the regional costs distribution of a world carbon tax. Similarly to the process of
allocating initial emission quotas within an international emissions trading scheme,
the choice of the tax revenue allocation rule may largely determine the distribution
of the economic cost. In this scenario, the allocation criterion gives a real incentive
to participate to the poorest regions like India and Africa but is unfavorable to other
developing countries such as China or Latin America.
4.4 OECD Carbon Tax Revenue Redistribution Based on Income and
Population
In the previous section, we concluded that only some of the DC have an incentive
to participate to a world carbon tax even with international tax revenue redistribu-
tion based on GDP per capita. As already pointed out, China and Latin America
are made relatively worse off with this form of redistribution. In this section we
address this issue by introducing a carbon tax for OECD countries only, of 15 USD
per ton. OECD encompasses the following world regions: EUR, XEU, USA, CAN,
AUZ, JAP and MEX. They account for more than 40% of GHG emissions in 2010
and 29% in 2040. We exclude FSU from the industrialized group, first, because it
is a major exporter of gas and crude oil and therefore the tax hits directly one of its
major sources of national revenue (about 60% of Russian exports in 20054).
The declining energy demand induces an important cost for this region, as it
does also for the MID region (Organisation For Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment, 2007). Second, the introduction of any tax penalizes FSU strongly and
combined with the declining energy demand, FSU would support a large share of
the tax-induced burden. Therefore, as with the Kyoto Protocol, FSU does not have
4COMTRADE (UNSD, 2007)
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an effective binding constraint (Kotov, 2002; Paltsev, 2000) and for this reason we
choose to exclude FSU from the industrialized countries bound by carbon tax (Hovi
and Holtsmark, 2006). For a variant around this point, refer to the sensitivity anal-
ysis appendix, OECD and FSU Carbon Tax with Climate Change Compensation.
Table 18: OECD Carbon Tax Revenue Redistribution Based on Income and Popu-
lation and World GHG Emissions
2010 2020 2030 2040
Carbon tax in USD 15 15 15 15
Carbon tax revenue in billion USD 47 50 52 53
GHG Emissions variation -1.1% -0.9% -0.8% -0.7%
CO2 Emissions variation -1.7% -1.4% -1.2% -1.0%
Temperature increase in ◦C 0.71 0.89 1.12 1.38
Difference w.r.t. baseline in ◦C 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
Table 18 shows that the carbon tax revenue is relatively minor, only 53 billion
USD, which are redistributed among all countries based on GDP per capita. The
impact on the temperature with respect to the baseline is null. This illustrates the
extent of carbon leakage. Indeed, although the OECD carbon tax still applies to
some 40% of world GHG emissions, it obtains only 22% (in 2010) to 7% (in 2040)
of the CO2 emissions reduction obtained with the World Tax (compare Table 15
and Table 18). The GHG and CO2 emissions variation is small and brings no
tangible results concerning global warming.
To explore options for overcoming this weakness, we now propose that the tax
level in the next simulations be set endogenously on the basis of the damage costs
estimated for DC. In so doing, the principle is that the aggregate tax revenue will
cover the damage costs.
5 Devising a Carbon Tax on the Basis of Damage Costs of
Climate Change
5.1 Damages Costs Estimates of Climate Change
Several studies have attempted to estimate damage costs due to climate change as a
percentage of GDP (see table 19). Among the most recent studies, Kemfert (2005),
using the WIAGEM model, predicts substantial damage costs in India and Asia in
2050 (5.89%) as well as high damage costs for China and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Earlier work by Kemfert (2002), also with the WIAGEM model, found significant
damage costs for Canada, New Zealand and Australia (3.13% for 2050 and 3.55%
for 2100).
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), using the RICE-99 model and contrary to Kem-
fert, found high damage costs in Europe (2.83%). Nevertheless, their estimates
for India and Sub-Saharan Africa are relatively similar (4.93% and 3.91%). The
FUND model developed by Tol (2002) predicts climate change gains for the USA,
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Europe and Russia among others for the year 2050 with 1◦C temperature increase.
However, Tol also expects substantial loss for Africa (4.10%).
Table 19: Damages Costs of Climate Change in % of GDP∗
WIAGEM1 WIAGEM2 RICE3 FUND4
2050 2100 2050 2100(2.5◦C) 2050(1◦C)
USA 1.13% 1.22% 0.67% 0.45% -3.40%
EU15 0.84% 0.85% 0.72% 2.83% -3.70%
Canada, New Zeal., Australia 3.13% 3.55% 0.76%
Japan 0.61% 0.59% 0.69% 0.50% -1.00%
Russia 0.51% 0.85% 1.31% -0.65% -2.00%
Eastern and Central Europe 0.51% 0.85% 1.31% 0.71% -2.00%
China 3.12% 2.54% 3.54% 0.22% -2.10%
India 4.85% 5.49% 5.89% 4.93% 1.70%
Latin America 0.85% 0.95% 2.23% 0.10%
Asia 4.85% 5.49% 5.89% 1.70%
Mexico 0.87% 1.01%
Middle East 0.65% 0.95% 1.95% -1.10%
North Africa 0.65% 0.95%
ROW 1.95% 2.15% 0.82%
Subsaharian Africa 2.21% 3.66% 2.26% 3.91% 4.10%
Source: 1Kemfert (2002), 2Kemfert (2005), 3Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), 4Tol (2002)
∗positive sign denotes damages
Recently, the Stern Review Stern (2007) has reported relatively high estimates
based on the PAGE2002 model developed by Wahbaa and Hope (2006). In the
next scenarios, the tax rate is endogenously determined by the GEMINI-E3 model
and varies according to the estimated damage costs for DC. The idea is that the
tax revenue must cover those costs as reported by the Stern Review. However
some of assumptions made for our reference scenario differ from the assumptions
made by the Stern Review. Therefore, we interpolate (see table 20) the results of
the PAGE2002 model with respect to the temperature increase of our reference sce-
nario. Table 20 provides the tax revenue target which equalizes the global warming
impact as percent of GDP in DC as already mentioned. For our simulations, data
has been personally and kindly provided by C. Hope using his PAGE2002 model
but, contrary to the model version used by the Stern Review, neither balanced
growth equivalents nor equity weights have been taken into account to compute
the estimated damage costs for DC.
In each of the following scenarios in this chapter, the total tax revenue equals
the sum of damage costs for DC, and it is then redistributed only to DC according
to the estimated damages they suffer. In other words, the tax is set endogenously.
Only the tax base varies according to the scenario considered (e.g., type of GHG
emissions taxed, countries participating in the tax scheme) and the tax base param-
eters are precisely defined for each scenario.
Given the small impact of the tax on temperature increase (< 0.1◦C) found
in the next scenarios and the large uncertainties on climate sensitivity, we do not
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re-estimate the damage costs when the tax is applied.
Table 20: Temperature increase and damage costs for developing countries
2010 2020 2030 2040
Temperature increase 0.71 0.89 1.12 1.38
Reference scenario
Impacts as % of GDP
MEX 0.20% 0.25% 0.31% 0.39%
CHI 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01%
IND 0.83% 1.04% 1.30% 1.61%
ASI 0.83% 1.04% 1.30% 1.61%
LAT 0.20% 0.25% 0.31% 0.39%
MID 0.50% 0.63% 0.79% 0.98%
AFR 0.50% 0.63% 0.79% 0.98%
Impacts in millions of USD
MEX 1831 3 480 6 119 9 055
CHI 109 235 480 784
IND 8 726 18 841 38 921 65 085
ASI 20 042 33 223 51 481 66 830
LAT 4 473 7 586 13 128 18 688
MID 7 580 13 910 25 766 37 378
AFR 5 054 9 357 17 223 25 551
Sum 47 815 86 632 153 118 223 372
5.2 OECD Carbon Tax with Climate Change Compensation
In the following scenario, we suppose that the tax on carbon emissions is only
applied to OECD countries (EUR, XEU, USA, CAN, AUZ, JAP and MEX). In this
case, MEX pays the tax but also receives part of the tax revenue on the basis of the
estimated damage costs it suffer. The tables 21, 22, 23 and 24 present the results
of this simulation. The tax is much higher in comparison with the last scenario but
impacts only weakly on the level of emissions reduction. Table 22 shows a small
increase of CO2 emissions in DC (+2% in 2040) coming from two well known
channels (Paltsev, 2001). First, the decrease in energy demand in OECD induces a
decline in international energy prices which in turn increases energy demand in DC.
Second, the loss of competitiveness for energy intensive industries in industrialized
regions leads to relocation of some production to DC.
In addition, the money transfers from the OECD increase purchasing power
and thereby energy consumption by DC households. As expected, DC are better
off than under the previous scenario as they receive larger money transfers from
OECD. Recall that damage costs of climate change are not deducted from their
welfare in these calculations. In fact, when the welfare gains from their policy
are compared with the damage costs in Table 20, it appears that all regions with
the exception of China are overcompensated. The result is that the welfare loss
of OECD is more important, and some regions like CAN, AUZ and XEU would
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be strongly affected. In this scenario, the main contributors to the international
transfer would be USA and EUR with contributions estimated respectively at 118
and 62 billions USD in 2040.
Table 21: Carbon Tax and World GHG Emissions — Scenario OECD Carbon Tax
with Climate Change Compensation
2010 2020 2030 2040
Carbon tax in USD 16 28 49 72
Carbon tax revenue in billion USD 48 87 153 223
GHG Emissions variation -1.1% -1.7% -2.3% -2.6%
CO2 Emissions variation -1.5% -2.3% -3.2% -3.6%
Temperature increase in ◦C 0.71 0.89 1.11 1.37
Difference w.r.t. baseline in ◦C 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01
Table 22: CO2 Emissions change in % — Scenario OECD Carbon Tax with Cli-
mate Change Compensation
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -3.1% -5.2% -7.8% -9.9%
XEU -4.3% -7.3% -10.8% -13.6%
FSU 0.3% 0.3% 0.5% 0.7%
USA -4.4% -7.6% -11.6% -14.8%
CAN -2.9% -4.7% -7.0% -8.8%
AUZ -5.2% -9.1% -13.9% -17.7%
JAP -2.9% -5.1% -7.8% -10.0%
MEX -2.3% -3.5% -5.8% -8.0%
CHI 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4%
IND 1.2% 1.0% 1.3% 2.0%
ASI 0.9% 1.1% 1.5% 1.9%
LAT 0.6% 0.8% 1.3% 1.7%
MID 0.7% 0.9% 1.4% 1.8%
AFR 0.7% 1.0% 1.4% 1.7%
World -1.5% -2.3% -3.2% -3.6%
When looking at Tables 23 and 24, we see that some OECD countries may not
be willing to participate in such a scheme. As already mentioned, it is quite penal-
izing for countries like XEU, CAN and AUZ in terms of welfare. The USA may
also be reluctant to participate given the amount involved in international transfers.
This leads us to consider a scenario where some OECD opt out of the carbon tax
scheme.
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Table 23: Welfare impact in percent of household consumption — Scenario OECD
Carbon Tax with Climate Change Compensation
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -0.35% -0.47% -0.64% -0.77%
XEU -0.53% -0.72% -1.01% -1.23%
FSU -0.11% -0.27% -0.45% -0.60%
USA -0.32% -0.46% -0.63% -0.74%
CAN -0.74% -1.03% -1.42% -1.68%
AUZ -0.91% -1.22% -1.60% -1.80%
JAP -0.21% -0.28% -0.38% -0.45%
MEX 0.02% -0.01% -0.17% -0.31%
CHI -0.09% -0.09% -0.10% -0.09%
IND 3.28% 4.92% 6.90% 8.15%
ASI 2.22% 2.79% 3.20% 3.20%
LAT 0.54% 0.63% 0.79% 0.86%
MID 1.22% 1.27% 1.72% 1.91%
AFR 1.17% 1.33% 1.77% 2.00%
WORLD -0.01% -0.02% -0.03% -0.09%
Table 24: International transfers in billions USD — Scenario OECD Carbon Tax
with Climate Change Compensation
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -14 -25 -43 -62
XEU -1 -3 -4 -6
FSU 0 0 0 0
USA -24 -45 -81 -118
CAN -2 -4 -6 -9
AUZ -2 -3 -5 -7
JAP -4 -7 -11 -15
MEX 0 0 0 -1
CHI 0 0 0 1
IND 9 19 40 67
ASI 20 34 53 68
LAT 5 8 13 19
MID 8 14 26 38
AFR 5 10 18 26
sum 0 0 0 0
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5.3 Carbon Tax in Europe, Japan and Mexico With Climate Change
Compensation
In this scenario, we assume that some OECD countries are reluctant to participate
in an international environmental agreement on global warming. In line with typ-
ical commentaries and our above results, we suppose the USA, CAN, AUZ and
MEX would not take part in such an agreement. The tax now applies only to the
carbon emissions of EUR, XEU and JAP, which amount to 17% of world emissions
in 2010 and 12% in 2040 (see Table 4). Tables 25, 27 and 28 summarize the results.
As can easily be seen, the impact on climate change is insignificant, the tempera-
ture does not change with respect to the baseline and GHG emissions variations are
minimal even though the tax reaches incredible levels (up to 194 USD/tC in 2040).
Table 25: Carbon Tax and GHG Emissions – Scenario Carbon Tax on European
and Japanese Emissions with Climate Change Compensation
2010 2020 2030 2040
Carbon tax in USD 38 71 130 194
Carbon tax revenue in billion USD 48 87 153 223
GHG Emissions variation -0.7% -1.1% -1.3% -1.3%
CO2 Emissions variation -1.0% -1.5% -1.8% -1.9%
Temperature increase in ◦C 0.71 0.89 1.12 1.38
Difference w.r.t. baseline in ◦C 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
Table 26: CO2 Emissions change in % — Scenario Carbon Tax on European and
Japanese Emissions with Climate Change Compensation
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -6.8% -11.0% -15.2% -18.0%
XEU -9.0% -14.4% -19.6% -23.2%
FSU 0.4% 0.6% 1.0% 1.3%
USA 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4%
CAN 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6%
AUZ 1.7% 2.1% 2.2% 2.5%
JAP -6.5% -10.5% -14.5% -17.3%
MEX -5.6% -8.4% -13.1% -16.9%
CHI 0.5% 0.5% 0.6% 0.5%
IND 1.2% 0.9% 1.1% 1.7%
ASI 0.9% 1.0% 1.3% 1.5%
LAT 0.5% 0.7% 0.9% 1.2%
MID 0.6% 0.9% 1.3% 1.7%
AFR 1.0% 1.3% 1.7% 2.1%
World -1.0% -1.5% -1.8% -1.9%
The OECD that pays for the tax must bear a large impact on their welfare in
terms of household consumption. EUR and JAP must pay the huge sums of 150
and 37 billion USD respectively in 2040 in international transfers.
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Table 27: Welfare impact in percent of household consumption – Scenario Carbon
Tax on European and Japanese Emissions with climate change compensation
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -0.85% -1.21% -1.73% -2.10%
XEU -1.16% -1.56% -2.24% -2.68%
FSU -0.12% -0.27% -0.46% -0.62%
USA 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% -0.01%
CAN 0.00% -0.01% -0.03% -0.04%
AUZ -0.18% -0.19% -0.14% -0.10%
JAP -0.50% -0.71% -0.98% -1.16%
MEX -0.44% -0.71% -1.27% -1.68%
CHI -0.07% -0.06% -0.06% -0.05%
IND 3.28% 4.92% 6.91% 8.17%
ASI 2.23% 2.81% 3.23% 3.23%
LAT 0.56% 0.66% 0.84% 0.92%
MID 1.35% 1.44% 1.96% 2.21%
AFR 1.15% 1.33% 1.78% 2.03%
WORLD -0.04% -0.07% -0.10% -0.26%
Table 28: International transfers in billions USD – Scenario Carbon Tax on Euro-
pean and Japanese Emissions with Climate Change Compensation
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -32 -58 -103 -150
XEU -3 -6 -10 -15
FSU 0 0 0 0
USA 0 0 0 0
CAN 0 0 0 0
AUZ 0 0 0 0
JAP -10 -17 -28 -37
MEX -2 -4 -9 -16
CHI 0 0 0 1
IND 9 19 40 67
ASI 20 34 53 68
LAT 5 8 13 19
MID 8 14 26 38
AFR 5 10 18 26
sum 0 0 0 0
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5.4 World Carbon Tax with Climate Change Compensation
In the following scenario we are concerned about improving the tax efficiency with
respect to climate change. Thus, we suppose that a world uniform tax is applied
to all CO2 emissions emitted in the world. The level of the tax is set to meet the
revenue target, which corresponds to total estimated damages from climate change
for DC. That revenue is then redistributed according to the regional damage costs
of climate change exposed in Table 20. The tables 29 to 32 present the results of
this scenario. All countries participate significantly in world emissions reduction
efforts, which in turn slightly lowers global warming, the temperature decreasing
by 0.04◦C with respect to the reference scenario in 2040. In comparison with the
OECD Carbon Tax with Climate Change Compensation scenario, the tax rate is
divided by three and the decline in GHG emissions is multiplied by almost six.
Table 29: Carbon Tax and World GHG Emissions — Scenario World Carbon Tax
with Climate Change Compensation
2010 2020 2030 2040
Carbon tax in USD 7 11 18 25
Carbon tax revenue in billion USD 48 87 153 223
GHG Emissions variation -3.2% -6.4% -10.5% -14.5%
CO2 Emissions variation -4.3% -8.6% -14.1% -19.3%
Temperature increase in ◦C 0.71 0.88 1.10 1.34
Difference w.r.t. baseline in ◦C -0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.04
Table 31 presents the relative welfare impacts of this scenario. The welfare
changes due to the costs or gains due to climate changes are not accounted for. All
the developing countries benefit from the implementation of this tax, except China
for which a welfare loss is estimated at 2.75% of household consumption. This is
a consequence of the fact that the estimated damage costs of climate change for
China are rather small and that China is a positive net contributor with regard to
the tax revenue; its contribution is more important that of the USA (see Table 32)
Concerning OECD, the welfare losses are modest except for FSU whose wel-
fare losses are equal to 3.44% of household consumption. This is mainly coming
from loss of terms of trade (decrease of fossil energy prices due to the declining
demand).
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Table 30: CO2 Emissions change in %—ScenarioWorld Carbon Tax with Climate
Change Compensation
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -1.2% -2.0% -3.0% -3.9%
XEU -1.9% -3.1% -4.6% -6.0%
FSU -2.6% -4.4% -7.1% -9.9%
USA -2.0% -3.3% -5.0% -6.5%
CAN -1.2% -1.9% -2.7% -3.4%
AUZ -1.9% -3.4% -5.4% -7.2%
JAP -0.9% -1.7% -2.7% -3.8%
MEX -0.9% -1.3% -2.1% -2.9%
CHI -15.8% -25.7% -36.4% -44.6%
IND -4.3% -9.2% -15.0% -20.2%
ASI -1.4% -3.2% -5.5% -7.9%
LAT -0.9% -1.5% -2.4% -3.3%
MID -0.9% -1.4% -2.4% -3.3%
AFR -1.9% -3.6% -6.1% -8.8%
World -4.3% -8.6% -14.1% -19.3%
Table 31: Welfare impact in percent of household consumption — Scenario World
Carbon Tax with Climate Change Compensation
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -0.15% -0.17% -0.21% -0.24%
XEU -0.29% -0.34% -0.44% -0.50%
FSU -1.78% -2.19% -2.96% -3.44%
USA -0.17% -0.24% -0.32% -0.38%
CAN -0.36% -0.46% -0.59% -0.66%
AUZ -0.54% -0.65% -0.79% -0.85%
JAP -0.07% -0.09% -0.11% -0.12%
MEX 0.24% 0.34% 0.39% 0.40%
CHI -1.23% -1.80% -2.42% -2.75%
IND 2.34% 3.54% 5.06% 6.09%
ASI 1.88% 2.33% 2.60% 2.52%
LAT 0.31% 0.35% 0.42% 0.44%
MID 0.64% 0.70% 0.98% 1.13%
AFR 0.70% 0.79% 1.04% 1.18%
WORLD -0.01% -0.02% -0.03% -0.10%
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Table 32: International transfers in billions USD — Scenario World Carbon Tax
with Climate Change Compensation
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -6 -11 -17 -24
XEU -1 -1 -2 -2
FSU -5 -8 -14 -20
USA -11 -19 -33 -46
CAN -1 -2 -2 -3
AUZ -1 -1 -2 -3
JAP -2 -3 -4 -6
MEX 1 2 4 5
CHI -8 -17 -33 -51
IND 6 14 29 49
ASI 17 27 41 51
LAT 3 4 7 10
MID 5 9 16 24
AFR 3 6 11 16
sum 0 0 0 0
5.5 World GHG Tax with Climate Change Compensation
In this scenario, we assume that all the world GHG emissions are taxed (and not
only CO2) and that revenue is redistributed according to the estimated climate dam-
ages for DC. The tables 33 to 36 present the results of this scenario. In terms of
welfare, differences with the scenario World Carbon Tax with Climate Change
Compensation come mainly from the situation of each country with respect to non
CO2 emissions and from its dependency on energy imports (or energy exports).
Countries in which non CO2 emissions represent an important share in total GHG
emissions, suffer relatively more from the introduction of a GHG tax. This is the
case of AFR and LAT where the share of non CO2 emissions in their GHG emis-
sions is equal respectively to 62% and 57% in 2001. For these two regions the
welfare gain is respectively equal to 0.63% (against 1.18%) and 0.15% (against
0.44%). Moreover, in this scenario the CO2 emissions reduction and energy de-
mand are smaller. This also explains why energy exporters are relatively better off,
like FSU -2.87% (against -3.44%) and MID +1.35% (against 1.13%).
Table 33: GHG Tax and World GHG Emissions — Scenario World GHG Tax with
Climate Change Compensation
2010 2020 2030 2040
GHG tax in USD 5 8 13 18
GHG tax revenue in billion USD 48 87 153 223
GHG Emissions variation -5.5% -8.9% -13.0% -16.6%
CO2 Emissions variation -3.3% -6.7% -11.4% -16.1%
Temperature increase in ◦C 0.71 0.88 1.08 1.32
Difference w.r.t. baseline in ◦C -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06
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As regards the tax effectiveness, the simulation predicts -0.06 ◦C difference
for the temperature indicator, with respect to the baseline. This result once again
stems from the fact that methane (CH4) emissions are also targeted and this brings
tangible effects rapidly as already explained.
Table 34: CO2 Emissions change in % — Scenario World GHG Tax with Climate
Change Compensation
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -0.9% -1.5% -2.3% -2.9%
XEU -1.4% -2.3% -3.5% -4.5%
FSU -2.1% -3.3% -5.4% -7.6%
USA -1.5% -2.4% -3.7% -4.8%
CAN -0.9% -1.4% -2.0% -2.5%
AUZ -1.4% -2.4% -3.9% -5.2%
JAP -0.6% -1.2% -1.9% -2.7%
MEX -0.7% -1.1% -1.7% -2.3%
CHI -12.3% -20.6% -30.4% -38.6%
IND -3.1% -6.8% -11.4% -15.7%
ASI -1.0% -2.3% -3.9% -5.6%
LAT -0.7% -1.2% -1.9% -2.6%
MID -0.6% -1.0% -1.7% -2.3%
AFR -1.4% -2.5% -4.4% -6.4%
World -3.3% -6.7% -11.4% -16.1%
Looking at the tax level, it can be seen that using a larger GHG tax base instead
of carbon tax, lowers the tax level from 25 to 18 USD. Despite this fact, China still
pays a great amount since it is taxed for about 52 billion USD. From a narrowly
economic perspective, this solution appears as a first best policy. The tax base
includes all the various sources of global warming (GHG) and all countries. This
solution brings definitively better overall results.
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Table 35: Welfare impact in percent of household consumption — Scenario World
GHG Tax with Climate Change Compensation
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -0.14% -0.16% -0.20% -0.23%
XEU -0.26% -0.31% -0.39% -0.43%
FSU -1.59% -1.95% -2.56% -2.87%
USA -0.14% -0.20% -0.27% -0.32%
CAN -0.33% -0.43% -0.53% -0.58%
AUZ -0.50% -0.62% -0.76% -0.81%
JAP -0.07% -0.08% -0.10% -0.11%
MEX 0.22% 0.30% 0.37% 0.39%
CHI -1.20% -1.67% -2.29% -2.63%
IND 2.28% 3.53% 5.03% 6.02%
ASI 1.82% 2.25% 2.50% 2.42%
LAT 0.15% 0.14% 0.15% 0.15%
MID 0.72% 0.77% 1.13% 1.35%
AFR 0.39% 0.42% 0.55% 0.63%
WORLD -0.01% -0.02% -0.03% -0.07%
Table 36: International transfers in billions USD— Scenario GHGWorld Tax with
Climate Change Compensation
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -6 -9 -15 -20
XEU -1 -1 -2 -2
FSU -4 -8 -13 -18
USA -10 -16 -27 -37
CAN -1 -2 -2 -3
AUZ -1 -1 -2 -3
JAP -2 -2 -4 -4
MEX 1 2 3 5
CHI -8 -17 -33 -52
IND 6 14 29 48
ASI 16 26 40 50
LAT 1 2 3 4
MID 5 9 17 25
AFR 2 3 6 9
sum 0 0 0 0
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6 Devising a Carbon Tax on the Basis of Adaptation Costs
of Climate Change
Setting the revenue target according to the estimated damage costs may be a bold
goal since, as it has been shown, some key global players may be reluctant to
take part in such an agreements. Therefore in this section we set the target rev-
enue to cover the adaptation costs. Various studies have shown that adaptation can
bring numerous benefits at a lower cost (for instance, refer to the World Bank re-
port (2006)). In Table 37, the adaptation costs are assumed to be equal to 20%
of the damage estimates (see Table 20). This threshold of 20% is a compromise
a several rough estimates. For instance, R.S.J. et al. (June 1998) suggest that the
optimal adaptation costs lie between 7 and 25% of damage estimates. Recently,
a World Bank report (2006) assumed that the adaptation costs amount to some 40
billion USD per year but could range from a few billion to up to 100 billion.
Thus, there is no coherent set of estimates for climate change adaptation as
whole, meaning that the calculations presented here are subject to much uncertainty
and engage some relatively arbitary conventions.
Table 37: Adaptation costs in millions of USD
2010 2020 2030 2040
MEX 366 696 1224 1811
CHI 22 47 96 157
IND 1745 3768 7784 13017
ASI 4008 6645 10296 13366
LAT 895 1517 2626 3738
MID 1516 2782 5153 7476
AFR 1011 1871 3445 5110
Sum 9563 17326 30624 44674
In view of this, we perform a sensitivity analysis around our main assump-
tions, by fixing the adaptation costs at 10% and 30% of the estimated damages
(refer to the appendix). In all the following scenarios, the tax revenue collected is
redistributed according to the estimated adaptation costs of DC.
6.1 OECD Carbon Tax for Climate Change Adaptation
In this scenario, we assume that only OECD countries are subject to the carbon tax
and that the tax revenue is fixed to match the adaptations costs over the period 2010
to 2040 (see Table 37). Table 38 presents the results of this scenario. The tax level
is very low since it starts at 3 USD per ton of carbon in 2010 and reaches 13 USD
in 2040. The impact on climate change is negligible (less than 1% on emissions
variation and no temperature difference with respect to the baseline).
Table 39 presents the CO2 emissions variation. As expected the variation are
relatively modest and since the tax has little impact in OECD countries we do not
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Table 38: Carbon Tax and World GHG Emissions — Scenario OECD Carbon Tax
for Climate Change Adaptation
2010 2020 2030 2040
Carbon tax in USD 3 5 9 13
Carbon tax revenue in billion USD 10 17 31 45
GHG Emissions variation -0.2% -0.4% -0.5% -0.7%
CO2 Emissions variation -0.3% -0.5% -0.7% -0.9%
Temperature increase in ◦C 0.71 0.89 1.12 1.38
Difference w.r.t. baseline in ◦C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
observe strong carbon leakage phenomena. AUZ and XEU are the regions that
undergo the greatest emissions changes.
Table 39: CO2 Emissions change in percent — Scenario OECD Carbon Tax for
Climate Change Adaptation
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -0.6% -1.2% -1.8% -2.5%
XEU -0.9% -1.6% -2.7% -3.6%
FSU 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2%
USA -0.9% -1.6% -2.7% -3.6%
CAN -0.6% -1.0% -1.5% -2.0%
AUZ -1.1% -2.0% -3.4% -4.7%
JAP -0.6% -1.2% -1.9% -2.7%
MEX -0.5% -0.7% -1.2% -1.8%
CHI 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
IND 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.5%
ASI 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% 0.5%
LAT 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4%
MID 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4%
AFR 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4%
World -0.3% -0.5% -0.7% -0.9%
As Table 40 shows, the impact on welfare is small enough to facilitate the
adoption of this carbon tax in a global framework. USA loss is only -0.15% with
respect to the baseline. CHI loss is extremely low, only -0.02%, and as already
pointed out in the previous simulations, IND is the biggest winner since it gains
1.82% with respect to the baseline. The biggest loosers are XEU, CAN and AUZ
(-0.24%, -0.32% and -0.39% respectively).
35
Table 40: Welfare impact in percent of household consumption — Scenario OECD
Carbon Tax for Climate Change Adaptation
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -0.07% -0.09% -0.13% -0.15%
XEU -0.11% -0.14% -0.20% -0.24%
FSU 0.03% -0.04% -0.08% -0.11%
USA -0.06% -0.09% -0.12% -0.15%
CAN -0.14% -0.20% -0.27% -0.32%
AUZ -0.19% -0.25% -0.34% -0.39%
JAP -0.04% -0.06% -0.07% -0.09%
MEX 0.00% 0.00% -0.02% -0.05%
CHI -0.02% -0.02% -0.02% -0.02%
IND 0.68% 1.04% 1.51% 1.82%
ASI 0.45% 0.57% 0.65% 0.65%
LAT 0.11% 0.13% 0.16% 0.17%
MID 0.24% 0.26% 0.36% 0.40%
AFR 0.24% 0.27% 0.36% 0.41%
WORLD 0.00% 0.00% -0.01% -0.01%
6.2 World Carbon Tax with Climate Change Adaptation
In this scenario the carbon tax is applied worldwide in order to collect funds for
climate change adaptation. Table 41 summarizes the main results. By increasing
the tax base, the rate is lower and efficiency is also enhanced. Since the tax is ap-
plied worldwide, effectiveness against climate change is reinforced with respect to
the previous scenario despite its relatively minor impact (CO2 emissions variation
is -5.9% in 2040, and temperature difference w.r.t. the baseline is only -0.01◦C). It
also allows a very low tax rate, only 4 USD/ton of carbon in 2040.
Table 41: Carbon Tax and World GHG Emissions — Scenario World Carbon Tax
for Climate Change Adaptation
2010 2020 2030 2040
Carbon tax in USD 1 2 3 4
Carbon tax revenue in billion USD 10 17 31 45
GHG Emissions variation -0.7% -1.5% -2.9% -4.5%
CO2 Emissions variation -0.9% -2.1% -3.8% -5.9%
Temperature increase in ◦C 0.71 0.89 1.11 1.37
Difference w.r.t. baseline in ◦C 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01
Table 41 shows the detailed CO2 emissions variation per world regions. CHI is
the region that reduces the most its emissions: by -15.5% in 2040. As previously
explained, CHI relies on large coal reserves to produce energy, which emits a lot
of carbon. Emissions in IND are reduced by -5.5% in 2040; this is the second
biggest relative emissions reduction after CHI. The welfare impact is less than 1%
negative for CHI and FSU (the latter being a large exporter of fossil energy). We
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Table 42: CO2 Emissions change in — Scenario World Carbon Tax for Climate
Change Adaptation
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -0.2% -0.4% -0.6% -0.7%
XEU -0.3% -0.6% -0.9% -1.1%
FSU -0.5% -0.9% -1.4% -2.0%
USA -0.4% -0.6% -1.0% -1.2%
CAN -0.2% -0.3% -0.5% -0.6%
AUZ -0.3% -0.6% -0.9% -1.2%
JAP -0.1% -0.3% -0.4% -0.5%
MEX -0.2% -0.3% -0.4% -0.5%
CHI -3.7% -6.7% -11.0% -15.5%
IND -0.9% -2.0% -3.5% -5.1%
ASI -0.2% -0.5% -0.9% -1.2%
LAT -0.2% -0.3% -0.5% -0.6%
MID -0.2% -0.3% -0.4% -0.6%
AFR -0.4% -0.7% -1.2% -1.7%
World -0.9% -2.1% -3.8% -5.9%
propose that this pattern of results should be broadly acceptable in the framework
of an international environmental agreement. For OECD countries, the impact is
so small that it is quite negligible.
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Table 43: Welfare impact in percent of household consumption — Scenario World
Carbon Tax for Climate Change Adaptation
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -0.03% -0.03% -0.04% -0.04%
XEU -0.06% -0.06% -0.08% -0.08%
FSU -0.29% -0.39% -0.52% -0.58%
USA -0.03% -0.05% -0.06% -0.07%
CAN -0.06% -0.08% -0.11% -0.12%
AUZ -0.11% -0.13% -0.16% -0.18%
JAP -0.01% -0.02% -0.02% -0.02%
MEX 0.05% 0.07% 0.09% 0.09%
CHI -0.26% -0.39% -0.54% -0.63%
IND 0.48% 0.74% 1.08% 1.32%
ASI 0.38% 0.48% 0.54% 0.53%
LAT 0.06% 0.08% 0.09% 0.10%
MID 0.13% 0.15% 0.23% 0.28%
AFR 0.15% 0.17% 0.23% 0.28%
WORLD 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.01%
6.3 World GHG Tax for Climate Change Adaptation
In this scenario, we apply a world GHG tax and the tax level is set endogenously to
match the adaptation costs occuring in DC. The tax revenue is then redistributed to
DC according to the estimated adaptation costs. Table 44 presents the main results.
Since taxing all GHG emissions increases effectiveness and efficiency, the tax level
is slightly lower and its impact is improved with respect to the previous scenario.
The temperature indicator increase is slowed down by -0.3◦C.
Table 44: GHG Tax and World GHG Emissions — Scenario World GHG Tax for
Climate Change Adaptation
2010 2020 2030 2040
Carbon tax in USD 1 2 2 3
Carbon tax revenue 10 17 31 45
GHG Emissions variation -3.0% -3.9% -4.9% -6.2%
CO2 Emissions variation -0.7% -1.6% -2.9% -4.6%
Temperature increase in ◦C 0.71 0.88 1.10 1.35
Difference w.r.t. baseline in ◦C -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.03
Table 45 summarizes the CO2 emissions variations per region. Since the tax
base includes all GHG, the impact on CO2 emissions is slightly reduced with re-
spect to the tax on carbon emissions. However we do still see a big impact on
CHI’s emissions (-12.0%).
Table 46 shows that the impact on CHI and FSU welfare is, once again, rela-
tively the most important, despite being reduced with respect to the scenarioWorld
Carbon Tax with Climate Change Adaptation. the variations with respect to the
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Table 45: CO2 Emissions variation in — Scenario World GHG Tax for Climate
Change Adaptation
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -0.2% -0.3% -0.4% -0.5%
XEU -0.2% -0.5% -0.7% -0.9%
FSU -0.4% -0.7% -1.1% -1.5%
USA -0.3% -0.5% -0.7% -0.9%
CAN -0.2% -0.3% -0.4% -0.4%
AUZ -0.2% -0.4% -0.7% -0.9%
JAP -0.1% -0.2% -0.3% -0.4%
MEX -0.2% -0.2% -0.3% -0.4%
CHI -2.8% -5.0% -8.4% -12.0%
IND -0.6% -1.5% -2.6% -3.8%
ASI -0.2% -0.4% -0.6% -0.9%
LAT -0.1% -0.2% -0.4% -0.5%
MID -0.1% -0.2% -0.3% -0.4%
AFR -0.3% -0.5% -0.9% -1.3%
World -0.7% -1.6% -2.9% -4.6%
Table 46: Welfare impact in percent of household consumption — Scenario World
GHG Tax with Climate Change Adaptation
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -0.03% -0.03% -0.04% -0.04%
XEU -0.05% -0.06% -0.07% -0.07%
FSU -0.25% -0.35% -0.47% -0.51%
USA -0.03% -0.04% -0.05% -0.06%
CAN -0.06% -0.08% -0.10% -0.11%
AUZ -0.10% -0.12% -0.15% -0.17%
JAP -0.01% -0.02% -0.02% -0.02%
MEX 0.04% 0.06% 0.08% 0.09%
CHI -0.25% -0.35% -0.49% -0.58%
IND 0.47% 0.74% 1.07% 1.31%
ASI 0.37% 0.46% 0.51% 0.50%
LAT 0.03% 0.03% 0.04% 0.05%
MID 0.14% 0.16% 0.25% 0.31%
AFR 0.09% 0.10% 0.14% 0.16%
WORLD 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.01%
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baseline are, however, not so large as to be inacceptable.
To summarize, a world GHG tax has only a slightly more important impact
on the temperature change by comparison to a world carbon tax, since all other
variations are extremely similar. From a pure economic perspective, a world GHG
tax is a first best policy (that is, the defined goal is achieved at the lowest cost).
7 Conclusions
The figures 5 and 6 summarize the scenarios simulated in this study5. We can
draw several lessons.
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Figure 5: World Cost versus GHG Abatement in 2040
Concerning a tax revenue set to compensate DC from climate change damages,
we can observe:
• One could consider not taxing DC for the reason that their economies would
suffer and the counterbalanced effort for the OECD would be acceptable.
Indeed, taxing developing countries will not encourage them to participate.
If all countries are taxed, China and FSU are clearly the least interested in
participating. FSU is a big polluter and receives nothing. Note that in all sim-
ulations USA is an important contributor to the international money transfer,
and its participation is therefore crucial.
5The black triangles represent the simulations with climate change compensation, the squares
represents the uniforms 15 USD tax simulations, and finally the green diamonds represent the simu-
lations with climate change adaptation
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Figure 6: IC Welfare Cost versus DC Welfare Costs in 2040
• In all simulations, the USA is an important contributor to the international
money transfert, and its participation is therefore crucial.
• Taxing only OECD countries would be an ineffective policy in respect to
emissions and participation incentives. Indeed world GHG emissions reduc-
tion would be very limited and emissions would actually increase in DC.
The economic burden supported by the OECD countries could be perceived
as too high and therefore the risk of withdrawal from any international en-
vironmental agreement would be significant. We have shown that if USA,
CAN and AUZ decide not to implement a such tax, the cost for other indus-
trialized countries could be multiplied at least by two (compare Tables 23
and 27), jeopardizing the implementation of such a policy.
• On the contrary, a flat low carbon tax (e.g. 15 USD) applied to all carbon
emissions worldwide could induce significant CO2 reduction with a limited
overall cost. GHG emissions would decrease by 11%, but the carbon tax
revenue is too small to compensate DC for the estimated damage costs of
climate change.
• If we want to compensate those damage costs, obtain significant carbon
emissions reduction, and not penalize severely the OECD, the only solution
is to tax all countries. The scenario performed on this assumption, shows
that carbon emission abatement would be substantial (more than 19%, see
Table 29), but that gains or losses stemming from changes in terms of trade
could induce pernicious effects on welfare. Notably, FSU would suffer from
loss of terms of trade (its welfare loss is estimated to 3.44% of household
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consumption). By contrast, Indian welfare gain is estimated to 6.09% of
household consumption (see Table 31).
• Finally, taxing all GHG emissions and not only carbon emissions generates
two gains: an environmental gain, GHG emissions abatement would be more
important (-16.6%w.r.t. -14.5% for the same tax revenue, compare Tables 29
and 33); and an economic gain, the global cost would decrease by 30%.
However, this solution appears difficult to implement.
• In general, the policies simulated affect China and India quite differently.
This is important, given that these are two countries that are often mentioned
in one breath. China is a loser with nearly any form of carbon tax, including
those that target only the industrialized countries. On the other hand, India
is a large winner when there is revenue redistribution, and even the world
carbon tax without redistribution affects it only moderately. The divergence
between these two countries is related to the facts that China holds large
reserves of fossil energy and its revenue per capita is much higher and grow-
ing faster than that of India. In addition, India is predicted to suffer greatly
from climate change while China is not. Thus it may well be much easier to
convince India to participate in global efforts than China.
Concerning a tax revenue for an adaptation fund, we can observe:
• The overall cost is reduced and this might foster the acceptance of such a
policy. Even countries like CHI or FSU, which, once again, must bear the
greatest losses in terms of welfare with respect to their baseline, should be
willing to participate if economic compensations (like a free trade agree-
ment) are offered to them in order to reduce their loss. The above remark on
China and India is also valid when it comes to the adaptation fund issue.
• The carbon tax would reach only 4 USD per ton in 2040. Once expressed in
units per ton of CO2, the tax rate is about 1 USD per ton. We can note again
the relative efficiency of the GHG tax over the carbon dioxide tax, as shown
in Figure 5, since for about the same world cost we obtain about 2% more in
world GHG abatement.
• The overall impact on climate change is negligible.
Finally, Figure 7 compares different scenarios of tax revenue with climate
change compensation with respect to the expected CO2 concentration until 2040.
Implementing self-enforcing international agreements on GHG emission abate-
ment is a difficult task. One effective way could be to link technology R&D with
climate change negotiations. Because of free-riding problems in the climate change
negotiations (Barrett, 1990, 1994; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1992; Hoel, 1994), in-
ternational environmental agreements must be self-enforcing. It is thus necessary
to create incentives for broad participation and full compliance.
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Figure 7: Comparison of different CO2 concentrations
Based on insights provided by game theory, some economists have proposed to
restructure incentives through “issues linkages” consisting in exchanging conces-
sions across different policy dimensions. Multilateral cooperation across different
issues gives the possibility to form agreements and to enforce them. Several au-
thors have proposed to link international environmental agreements to international
trade (e.g. (Barrett, 1997, 1999)), technology R&D and technology diffusion (e.g.
(Carraro and Siniscalco, 1996; Katsoulacos, 1996; Tol et al., 2000)), sustainable
development and greening development assistance (Beg et al., 2002; Toman, 2002),
international emission trading and the CDM (Viguier, 2004). It is noteworthy that
REME has recently started a wide-ranging research project (financed by the Euro-
pean Union) on international post-Kyoto climate policy, with special emphasis on
India and China and on technology transfer.
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8 Appendix: Sensitivity Analysis
8.1 OECD Carbon Tax with Climate Change Adaptation
8.1.1 Adaptations Amounts 10% of the Estimated Damage Costs (Low)
In this scenario, the adaption costs are assumed to amount to 10% of the estimated
damage costs and only OECD countries pay a carbon tax.
Table 47: Carbon Tax and World GHG Emissions — Scenario OECD Carbon Tax
with Climate Change Adaptation (Low)
2010 2020 2030 2040
Carbon tax in USD 1 3 4 6
Carbon tax revenue 5 9 15 22
GHG Emissions variation -0.1% -0.2% -0.3% -0.3%
CO2 Emissions variation -0.1% -0.3% -0.4% -0.5%
Temperature increase in ◦C 0.71 0.89 1.12 1.38
Difference w.r.t. baseline in ◦C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 48: CO2 Emissions change in — Scenario OECD Carbon Tax with Climate
Change Adaptation (Low)
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -0.3% -0.6% -0.9% -1.3%
XEU -0.4% -0.8% -1.4% -1.9%
FSU 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1%
USA -0.4% -0.8% -1.4% -1.9%
CAN -0.3% -0.5% -0.8% -1.0%
AUZ -0.5% -1.0% -1.7% -2.5%
JAP -0.3% -0.6% -1.0% -1.4%
MEX -0.2% -0.4% -0.6% -0.9%
CHI 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1%
IND 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
ASI 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
LAT 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2%
MID 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2%
AFR 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
World -0.1% -0.3% -0.4% -0.5%
8.1.2 Adaptations Amounts 30% of the Estimated Damage Costs (High)
In this scenario, the adaption costs are assumed to amount to 30% of the estimated
damage costs and only OECD countries pay a carbon tax.
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Table 49: Welfare impact in percent of household consumption — Scenario OECD
Carbon Tax with Climate Change Adaptation (Low)
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -0.03% -0.05% -0.06% -0.07%
XEU -0.05% -0.07% -0.10% -0.12%
FSU 0.05% -0.01% -0.04% -0.05%
USA -0.03% -0.05% -0.06% -0.07%
CAN -0.07% -0.10% -0.13% -0.16%
AUZ -0.09% -0.13% -0.17% -0.20%
JAP -0.02% -0.03% -0.04% -0.04%
MEX 0.00% 0.00% -0.01% -0.02%
CHI -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
IND 0.34% 0.53% 0.76% 0.92%
ASI 0.23% 0.28% 0.33% 0.33%
LAT 0.05% 0.06% 0.08% 0.09%
MID 0.12% 0.13% 0.18% 0.20%
AFR 0.12% 0.14% 0.18% 0.21%
WORLD 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.01%
Table 50: Carbon Tax and World GHG Emissions — Scenario OECD Carbon Tax
with Climate Change Adaptation (High)
2010 2020 2030 2040
Carbon tax in USD 5 8 14 20
Carbon tax revenue 14 26 46 67
GHG Emissions Variation -0.3% -0.5% -0.8% -1.0%
CO2 Emissions Variation -0.4% -0.7% -1.1% -1.3%
Temperature increase in ◦C 0.71 0.89 1.12 1.38
Difference w.r.t. baseline in ◦C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 51: CO2 Emissions change in — Scenario OECD Carbon Tax with Climate
Change Adaptation (High)
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -0.9% -1.7% -2.7% -3.6%
XEU -1.3% -2.4% -3.9% -5.3%
FSU 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
USA -1.3% -2.4% -3.9% -5.3%
CAN -0.9% -1.4% -2.2% -2.9%
AUZ -1.6% -3.0% -5.0% -6.9%
JAP -0.9% -1.7% -2.8% -3.9%
MEX -0.7% -1.1% -1.8% -2.6%
CHI 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2%
IND 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.7%
ASI 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.7%
LAT 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.6%
MID 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.6%
AFR 0.2% 0.3% 0.5% 0.6%
World -0.4% -0.7% -1.1% -1.3%
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Table 52: Welfare impact in percent of household consumption — Scenario OECD
Carbon Tax with Climate Change Adaptation (High)
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -0.10% -0.14% -0.19% -0.23%
XEU -0.16% -0.21% -0.30% -0.36%
FSU 0.01% -0.06% -0.13% -0.17%
USA -0.10% -0.14% -0.19% -0.22%
CAN -0.21% -0.30% -0.41% -0.48%
AUZ -0.28% -0.38% -0.50% -0.57%
JAP -0.06% -0.08% -0.11% -0.13%
MEX 0.01% 0.00% -0.04% -0.08%
CHI -0.03% -0.03% -0.03% -0.03%
IND 1.02% 1.55% 2.23% 2.69%
ASI 0.67% 0.85% 0.97% 0.97%
LAT 0.16% 0.19% 0.24% 0.26%
MID 0.37% 0.39% 0.53% 0.60%
AFR 0.36% 0.41% 0.54% 0.62%
WORLD 0.00% -0.01% -0.01% -0.02%
8.2 World Carbon Tax with Climate Change Adaptation
8.2.1 Adaptations Amounts 10% of the Estimated Damage Costs (Low)
In this scenario, the adaption costs are assumed to amount to 10% of the estimated
damage costs and all countries pay a carbon tax.
Table 53: Carbon Tax and World GHG Emissions — Scenario World Carbon Tax
with Climate Change Adaptation (Low)
2010 2020 2030 2040
Carbon tax in USD 1 1 2 2
Carbon tax revenue 5 9 15 22
GHG Emissions variation -0.3% -0.8% -1.5% -2.4%
CO2 Emissions variation -0.5% -1.1% -2.0% -3.1%
Temperature increase in ◦C 0.71 0.89 1.12 1.38
Difference w.r.t. baseline in ◦C 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
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Table 54: CO2 Emissions change in — Scenario World Carbon Tax with Climate
Change Adaptation (Low)
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -0.1% -0.2% -0.3% -0.3%
XEU -0.1% -0.3% -0.4% -0.6%
FSU -0.2% -0.4% -0.7% -1.0%
USA -0.2% -0.3% -0.5% -0.6%
CAN -0.1% -0.2% -0.2% -0.3%
AUZ -0.1% -0.3% -0.5% -0.6%
JAP -0.1% -0.1% -0.2% -0.2%
MEX -0.1% -0.1% -0.2% -0.3%
CHI -1.9% -3.4% -5.8% -8.3%
IND -0.4% -1.0% -1.8% -2.6%
ASI -0.1% -0.3% -0.4% -0.5%
LAT -0.1% -0.1% -0.2% -0.3%
MID -0.1% -0.1% -0.2% -0.3%
AFR -0.2% -0.3% -0.6% -0.8%
World -0.5% -1.1% -2.0% -3.1%
Table 55: Welfare impact in percent of household consumption — Scenario World
Carbon Tax with Climate Change Adaptation (Low)
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -0.01% -0.02% -0.02% -0.02%
XEU -0.03% -0.03% -0.04% -0.04%
FSU -0.11% -0.18% -0.25% -0.28%
USA -0.02% -0.02% -0.03% -0.04%
CAN -0.03% -0.04% -0.05% -0.06%
AUZ -0.05% -0.07% -0.08% -0.09%
JAP -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01%
MEX 0.02% 0.04% 0.04% 0.05%
CHI -0.13% -0.20% -0.27% -0.32%
IND 0.24% 0.37% 0.55% 0.67%
ASI 0.19% 0.24% 0.27% 0.26%
LAT 0.03% 0.04% 0.05% 0.05%
MID 0.06% 0.08% 0.12% 0.15%
AFR 0.08% 0.09% 0.12% 0.14%
WORLD 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
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8.2.2 Adaptations Amounts 30% of the Estimated Damage Costs (High)
In this scenario, the adaption costs are assumed to amount to 30% of the estimated
damage costs and all countries pay a carbon tax.
Table 56: Carbon Tax and World GHG Emissions — Scenario World Carbon Tax
with Climate Change Adaptation (High)
2010 2020 2030 2040
Carbon tax in USD 2 3 5 7
Carbon tax revenue 15 26 46 67
GHG Emissions Variation -1.0% -2.3% -4.2% -6.3%
CO2 Emissions Variation -1.4% -3.0% -5.5% -8.4%
Temperature increase in ◦ 0.71 0.89 1.11 1.37
Difference w.r.t. baseline in ◦C 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01
Table 57: CO2 Emissions change in — Scenario World Carbon Tax with Climate
Change Adaptation (High)
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -0.3% -0.6% -0.9% -1.1%
XEU -0.5% -0.9% -1.3% -1.7%
FSU -0.7% -1.3% -2.1% -3.1%
USA -0.6% -1.0% -1.5% -1.9%
CAN -0.3% -0.5% -0.8% -0.9%
AUZ -0.5% -0.9% -1.5% -1.9%
JAP -0.2% -0.4% -0.6% -0.9%
MEX -0.3% -0.4% -0.6% -0.8%
CHI -5.4% -9.7% -15.6% -21.6%
IND -1.3% -3.0% -5.2% -7.5%
ASI -0.4% -0.8% -1.4% -2.0%
LAT -0.2% -0.4% -0.7% -1.0%
MID -0.2% -0.4% -0.7% -0.9%
AFR -0.6% -1.0% -1.8% -2.6%
World -1.4% -3.0% -5.5% -8.4%
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Table 58: Welfare impact in percent of household consumption — Scenario World
Carbon Tax with Climate Change Adaptation (High)
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -0.04% -0.05% -0.06% -0.07%
XEU -0.08% -0.10% -0.12% -0.13%
FSU -0.47% -0.60% -0.80% -0.90%
USA -0.05% -0.07% -0.09% -0.11%
CAN -0.10% -0.13% -0.16% -0.18%
AUZ -0.16% -0.20% -0.24% -0.27%
JAP -0.02% -0.02% -0.03% -0.03%
MEX 0.07% 0.11% 0.13% 0.14%
CHI -0.39% -0.58% -0.80% -0.93%
IND 0.72% 1.10% 1.60% 1.96%
ASI 0.57% 0.71% 0.80% 0.78%
LAT 0.10% 0.11% 0.14% 0.15%
MID 0.20% 0.23% 0.34% 0.41%
AFR 0.22% 0.25% 0.35% 0.41%
WORLD 0.00% 0.00% -0.01% -0.02%
8.3 OECD and FSU Carbon Tax with Climate Change Compensation
In this scenario, we assume the participation of FSU and OECD countries to a
carbon tax. The tax revenue is redistributed according to damage costs occured in
the DC.
Table 59: Carbon Tax and World GHG Emissions — Scenario OECD and FSU
Carbon Tax with Climate Change Compensation
2010 2020 2030 2040
Carbon tax in USD 13 22 39 57
Carbon tax revenue in billion USD 48 87 153 223
GHG Emissions variation -1.2% -1.9% -2.7% -3.2%
CO2 Emissions variation -1.6% -2.6% -3.7% -4.4%
Temperature increase in ◦C 0.71 0.89 1.11 1.37
Difference w.r.t. baseline in ◦C 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01
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Table 60: CO2 Emissions change in % — Scenario OECD and FSU Carbon Tax
with Climate Change Compensation
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -2.4% -4.2% -6.3% -8.0%
XEU -3.4% -5.8% -8.8% -11.3%
FSU -4.7% -8.1% -13.1% -17.8%
USA -3.6% -6.3% -9.7% -12.6%
CAN -2.4% -3.8% -5.8% -7.3%
AUZ -4.4% -7.6% -11.8% -15.3%
JAP -2.4% -4.3% -6.6% -8.6%
MEX -1.8% -2.8% -4.7% -6.6%
CHI 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4%
IND 1.1% 0.9% 1.3% 1.9%
ASI 0.9% 1.1% 1.5% 1.9%
LAT 0.6% 0.8% 1.2% 1.6%
MID 0.8% 1.2% 1.8% 2.5%
AFR 0.7% 0.9% 1.3% 1.7%
World -1.6% -2.6% -3.7% -4.4%
Table 61: Welfare impact in percent of household consumption — Scenario OECD
and FSU Carbon Tax with Climate Change Compensation
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -0.28% -0.37% -0.50% -0.60%
XEU -0.47% -0.63% -0.87% -1.05%
FSU -3.08% -4.11% -6.00% -7.31%
USA -0.29% -0.41% -0.57% -0.67%
CAN -0.62% -0.85% -1.17% -1.38%
AUZ -0.75% -0.99% -1.29% -1.45%
JAP -0.17% -0.22% -0.29% -0.35%
MEX 0.08% 0.09% 0.00% -0.11%
CHI -0.07% -0.07% -0.07% -0.06%
IND 3.29% 4.93% 6.92% 8.16%
ASI 2.23% 2.81% 3.23% 3.23%
LAT 0.53% 0.62% 0.79% 0.86%
MID 1.18% 1.24% 1.71% 1.94%
AFR 1.13% 1.29% 1.73% 1.98%
WORLD -0.01% -0.02% -0.03% -0.09%
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8.4 OECD and FSU Carbon Tax with Climate Change Adaptation
In this scenario, we assume the participation of FSU and OECD countries to a
carbon tax. The tax revenue is redistributed according to adaptation costs (20% of
damage costs estimates) occured in the DC.
Table 62: Carbon Tax and World GHG Emissions — Scenario OECD and FSU
Carbon Tax with Climate Change Adaptation
2010 2020 2030 2040
Carbon tax in USD 2 4 7 10
Carbon tax revenue in billion USD 10 17 31 45
GHG Emissions variation -0.2% -0.4% -0.6% -0.8%
CO2 Emissions variation -0.3% -0.6% -0.8% -1.1%
Temperature increase in ◦C 0.71 0.89 1.12 1.38
Difference w.r.t. baseline in ◦C 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 63: CO2 Emissions change in — Scenario OECD and FSU Carbon Tax with
Climate Change Adaptation
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -0.5% -0.9% -1.4% -1.9%
XEU -0.7% -1.3% -2.0% -2.8%
FSU -0.9% -1.8% -3.1% -4.7%
USA -0.7% -1.3% -2.2% -3.0%
CAN -0.5% -0.8% -1.2% -1.6%
AUZ -0.9% -1.7% -2.8% -3.9%
JAP -0.5% -0.9% -1.6% -2.2%
MEX -0.4% -0.6% -1.0% -1.4%
CHI 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
IND 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4%
ASI 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4%
LAT 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4%
MID 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5%
AFR 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4%
World -0.3% -0.6% -0.8% -1.1%
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Table 64: Welfare impact in percent of household consumption — Scenario OECD
and FSU Carbon Tax with Climate Change Adaptation
2010 2020 2030 2040
EUR -0.06% -0.07% -0.10% -0.12%
XEU -0.09% -0.12% -0.17% -0.20%
FSU -0.55% -0.77% -1.13% -1.37%
USA -0.06% -0.08% -0.11% -0.13%
CAN -0.12% -0.16% -0.22% -0.26%
AUZ -0.15% -0.20% -0.27% -0.31%
JAP -0.03% -0.04% -0.06% -0.07%
MEX 0.02% 0.02% 0.01% -0.01%
CHI -0.02% -0.02% -0.02% -0.02%
IND 0.68% 1.05% 1.51% 1.82%
ASI 0.45% 0.57% 0.66% 0.66%
LAT 0.11% 0.13% 0.16% 0.17%
MID 0.23% 0.25% 0.35% 0.40%
AFR 0.23% 0.26% 0.36% 0.41%
WORLD 0.00% 0.00% -0.01% -0.01%
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